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This study investigates how the use of collateral affects the incentives of borrowers, 
lenders and the relationship between them in loan pricing. Using the UK Survey of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises 2008, the results from a simultaneous equation approach show that 
high quality borrowers choose a contract with more collateral and lower interest rate, 
suggesting that collateral acts as an incentive device to adverse selection problem in credit 
markets. By distinguish business and personal collateral the findings suggest that personal 
collateral seems to be more effective in acting as a sorting device in line with screening 
models. Regarding the nature borrower-lender relationship the results also show a 
substitution effect between relationship length and collateral requirements from the main 
bank. But the main bank uses explicit loan interest rate as a loss leader to secure long-term 
rents on relationship business, suggesting that inter-temporal shifting rents is possible. 
 
Keywords: credit rationing, loan pricing, collateral, relationship lending, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs)  
 










Este estudo analisa o impacto da concessão de garantias (collateral) e o tipo de 
relacionamento entre credor e mutuário na determinação da taxa de juro dos empréstimos 
contraídos. Utilizando o questionário UKSMEF 2008, e adoptando o método de equações 
simultâneas, os resultados obtidos mostram que as pequenas e médias empresas (PME) 
inglesas utilizam as garantias (collateral) como factor de sinalização da sua qualidade 
creditícia, para obterem menores taxas de juro nos empréstimos contraídos. Estes resultados 
sugerem que o collateral funciona como um dispositivo para atenuar o problema da selecção 
adversa no mercado de crédito. Ao distinguir garantias pessoais (personal collateral) das 
garantias prestadas pela própria empresa (business collateral), os resultados sugerem que as 
garantias pessoais parecem ser mais eficazes enquanto dispositivo de sinalização de acordo 
com as teorias da sinalização. Considerando a natureza do relacionamento entre o credor e o 
mutuário, os resultados mostram um efeito de substituição entre a duração da relação 
bancária e as garantias a prestar pelo mutuário junto do banco principal (main bank). No 
entanto, o banco principal cobra aos seus mutuários taxas de juro mais elevadas com o 
objectivo de obter rendibilidades supranormais no médio e longo prazo (bargaining 
hypothesis). 
 
Palavras-Chave: racionamento de crédito, preço do crédito, garantias, relacionamento 
bancário, pequenas e médias empresas (PMEs). 
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 Microeconomic theories of banking and financial intermediation (e.g., Greenbaum and 
Thakor 1995) have explained the widespread use of collateral by its function to reduce credit 
rationing under asymmetric information. Theoretical credit rationing occurs if, in equilibrium, 
the demand for loans exceeds the supply at the prevailing interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). Because the expected banks’ return increases non-monotonously when the interest 
rate increases, banks would prefer rationing credit to opaque firms (usually small and young 
firms) rather than increasing the interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). In such situation, 
collateral would be an important tool for the bank to mitigate informational asymmetries and 
thus solve the credit-rationing problem.  
Pledging collateral to secure loans is a widespread important feature of the credit 
acquisition process. Cressy and Toivonen (2001) report that for 85% of loans collateral has to 
be provided, in the UK. In the USA, 70% of loans require collateral pledging (Berger and Udell 
1990). In addition, due the consolidation of the banking industry and the introduction of the 
Basel II Capital Accord, informational opaque firms will have to rely even more on collateral 
(Inderst and Mueller 2007). The consolidation of financial institutions would result in an 
increased use of transactions lending technologies (Berger and Frame 2007). Transaction-
lending technologies rely on a particular type of information, such as financial statement for 
lending, accounts receivable and inventory for asset-based lending, and credit scores. 
Therefore, only small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that can provide collateral to 
secure the repayment of the loan receive credit from banks (Berger 2006). The introduction 
of the Basel II Capital Accord is also expected to increase the importance of collateral for 
opaque firms. Contrary to the Basel I Capital Accord that treated all corporate lending alike, 
Basel II prescribes that banks engaging in higher risk lending, need to hold a higher amount of 
capital to safeguard their solvency and overall economic stability (Von Thadden 2004). 
Consequently, banks would prefer collateralized loans to reduce the risk of their loan 
portfolio (Bank for International Settlements 2004).  
 This growing importance of collateral in bank lending seems to have fuelled the 
interest in this research topic. Thus credit market research explains the use of collateral as a 
consequence of adverse selection (Besanko and Thakor 1987a,b;  Bester 1985; Chan and 
Kanatas 1985;), and/or moral hazard (Boot et al. 1991), which problems arise in transactions 
between borrowers and lenders. The nature of the borrower–lender relationship (Rajan 1992; 
Sharpe 1990), the level of competition in the credit market (Besanko and Thakor 1987a), and 
the net cost (benefits) of a thorough screening of borrowers can also explain why some loans 




Manove et al. 2001)1. However, results of these theoretical and empirical studies on the use 
of collateral as an informational asymmetry reducing tool are not consistent. For instance, 
literature has not yet settled as whether collateral signals a riskier or a safe loan or whether 
the nature of borrower-lender relationship increases or decreases the collateral requirements 
and/or the cost for obtaining a loan. 
 These seemingly contradicting results may be explained by research set-up failing to 
taking in accounting the simultaneity in debt terms; lenders do not determine the interest 
rate separately from any other loan terms such as collateral. Thus, the analytic framework 
concerning price-setting behaviour of banks and information availability on SMEs has been 
underdeveloped. Hence, the aim of this study is to investigate how the use of collateral 
affects the incentives of borrowers, lenders and the relationship between them. More 
specifically, the study analyses the following issues. First, the study examines if good 
borrower may offer collateral to reliably signal their low risk type, in turn of a loan contract 
with a lower interest rate (adverse selection effect) or riskier borrowers are more likely to be 
required to provide more collateral (moral hazard effect). Second, the study investigates how 
borrower-lender relationship affects the debt term contracts. Since the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature (e.g., Brick and Palia 2007; John et al. 2003) has strongly established 
that collateral requirements is endogenously determined, the study simultaneously examine 
the main loan contracts terms being the interest rate and collateral requirements, by using a 
simultaneous equation modelling. Furthermore, because in the context of SMEs the personal 
wealth of the owner is frequently used to access bank loans and so cannot be entirely 
separate from the assets of the business, this study distinguishes from these two types of 
collateral. 
 Because the majority of studies on loan collateralization is based on credit files of 
banks2 (e.g., Cressy and Toivanen 2001 – UK; Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000 – Belgian; Hanley 
2002 – UK; Hanley and Crook 2005 – UK; Jimenez et al. 2006 – Spain; Lehmann and Neuberger 
2001 – Germany) or for U.S. (e.g., Ang. et al. 1995; Avery et al. 1998; Berger and Udell 1990; 
Brick and Palia 2007), the data set employed by this study is based on the United Kingdom 
(UK) Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UKSMEF) conducted by the Center for 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (CSME), Warwick Business School. 
 The main findings of the study can be summarized as follows. The empirical results 
show strong evidence for jointness in the terms of lending. The findings suggest that if a 
financial institution considers pledging collateral necessary the loan is also characterized by 
higher interest rate. These results support the theories that view collateral as an incentive 
device to mitigate the moral hazard problem. However, the results also show that high 
quality borrowers (i.e., borrowers which know ex ant their credit quality but lenders do not 
know, or do not know exactly) choose a contract with more collateral (business collateral and 
personal collateral) and lower interest rate, in line with theories that explain collateral as a 
                                                 
1 For an extensive survey of the theoretical literature in the use of collateral see Coco (2000). 




signal of borrower´s credit quality, and thus, as a solution to adverse selection problem in 
credit markets. Moreover, the results of the variables related to loan characteristics also 
provide empirical support to the signal hypothesis. Regarding the nature of borrower-lender 
relationship the findings suggest that relationship lending is substitute to business collateral. 
This substitution effect is weaker for personal collateral. Furthermore, in line with the 
bargaining-power hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan 1994), the main bank seems uses explicit 
loan interest rate as a loss leader to secure long-term rents on relationship businesses. 
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by using simultaneous 
equation modelling approach, this study examines the simultaneous impact of the borrower-
lender relationship upon the explicit interest rate and one such on collateral. Taking in 
accounting the interdependences between these contractual debt term conditions may 
unravel prior ambiguous results. Second, by distinguish business and personal collateral, this 
study shows that personal collateral seems to be more effective in acting as a sorting device 
in line with screening models. As this study discusses subsequently, high quality firms seem to 
prefer pledge personal collateral. With this strategy the borrower avoids more restrictive 
usage of business collateral. From the point of view of the lender, personal collateral is more 
effective in limiting the borrower´s risk preferences incentives by enhancing the likelihood 
that the owner will feel the consequences of any ex post managerial shirking and risk- taking 
activities personally. Moreover, bonding by personal collateral provided by the borrower 
avoids more costly monitoring requested by business collateral or covenants (Harris and Raviv 
1991). 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two presents an overview about the 
role of collateral in mitigating informational asymmetries between the borrower and lender, 
hence solving credit rationing; then develops empirical hypotheses taking account the 
principles of jointness in debt terms of lending and the nature of borrower-lender 
relationship. Section three describes data and variables and explains the empirical method 






2. Credit rationing and the role of collateral as a 
solution for informational asymmetry between the 
borrower and the lender 
 
2.1. Credit rationing: an overview 
 
 Bank loans are the most widely used form of SMEs financing (European Commision 
2002; World Bank 2004). Although, the exchange relationship between lenders and borrowers 
often suffers from market imperfections, such as, information asymmetries (Cowling 2010; 
Craig et al. 2007; Freel 2007; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Zambaldi et al. 2011). These 
information asymmetries occur because the lenders have little and no reliable information 
about the default risk of the applicants (Besanko and Thakor 1987a). Because SMEs are mainly 
non listed firms, not followed by analysts and lacking any audited financial statements, they 
often have difficulties to signal their qualities to financial institutions in order to obtain bank 
finance (Craig et al. 2007; Freel 2007; Zambaldi et al. 2011). Moreover, these firms are not 
always willing to release any information since it is a time-consuming (costly) occupation. 
This dilemma is the so called opacity problem (Berger and Frame 2007). 
 This information asymmetry between bank and SMEs could be so severe that could 
lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The credit rationing is one of the most 
important examples of market failure in our modern economy (Steijvers and Voordeckers 
2009a). It can be defined as the situation where the demand for loans exceeds supply at the 
prevailing interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The rationing of demand may be achieved in 
two ways: either borrower does not receive the full amount of credit they have applied for 
(the so called “type I rationing”) or some of the borrowers are simply turned down (“type II 
rationing”). If there is an excess demand for bank funds it should be expected that banks 
raise loan price (the interest rate) to equal demand for loans with supply, thus increasing 
profits. But it is well known that in the normal course of bank lending this do not happen. 
They do not have an incentive to raise the interest rates when demand exceeds supply. As 
pointed out by Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009a) the bank-optimal interest rate is the 
equilibrium interest rate since at any interest rate above the bank-optimal interest, the 
expected return for the bank increases at a slower rate than the interest rate and will even 
decrease after a certain interest rate is exceeded. Consequently, some borrowers that will 
not receive bank credit are willing to pay a higher interest rate. If the bank accepted this 
higher interest rate this means that higher riskier borrowers are attracted (i.e., the adverse 
selection effect). It is a consequence of different borrowers having different probabilities of 




that the borrower quality is ex ante undetectable by the lending bank which gives the firm an 
unfair advantage. Sequentially, banks will not accept the higher interest rate because higher 
risk lending is not expected to be rewarded with higher return. Furthermore, if banks raise 
the interest rate, the borrowers will prefer higher riskier projects, which mean that the 
return of the bank will decrease again. This is the moral hazard effect (Steijvers and 
Voordeckers 2009a). These arguments suggest even in equilibrium that the demand will not 
equal the supply and that the banks will prefer to ration credit due to adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Thus, looking at the theoretical models 
studying the effects of an increase in loan price on the lender´s loan portfolio (e.g., Besanko 
and Thakor 1987a,b; Bester 1985), we conclude that some models only assume that credit 
terms contracts are specified only in terms of the interest rate or collateral, remain silent on 
possible interdependences between interest rate and collateral. But as argued by Coco 
(2000), a convincing theory of debt must consider the role of collateral and possible 
interdependences between interest rate and collateral. 
 
2.2. The jointness of collateral and interest rate in pricing of 
loans  
 
 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) signalling and monitoring are important ways 
of dealing with the shareholder–debtholder agency conflict. The adverse selection problem 
may be solved by use of incentive compatibility contracts written in terms of signals providing 
crucial information about the quality of different agents (Spence 1973). Hence, for firms 
wanting to signal their creditworthiness, collateral is more widely used rather than other 
more costly monitoring tools (e.g., Stulz and Johnson 1981). For instance, include debt 
covenants into debt contracts limit the behaviour of the borrower and put constraints on the 
management’s decisions (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979). But to completely avoid any 
incentive effects, these covenants would have to be very detailed and cover all aspects of the 
firm which is almost impossible. Thus, if the collateral´s value is more stable or more 
objectively ascertainable than the distribution of the returns from the project, the 
entrepreneur could profitability trade it for better interest rates (Chan and Kanatas 1985).  
 Thus, when the bank has at its disposal two informative instruments it may want to 
use them jointly as predicted by screening models (e.g., Besanko and Thakor 1987a, b; Bester 
1985, 1987). These theoretical models show that banks simultaneously choose between 
collateral requirements and the interest rate to screen investors´ riskiness. As a result, it is 
possible to use different contract terms as a self-selection mechanism to separate borrowers 
of different risk. Hence collateral is used as signal device of high credit quality in situation of 
adverse selection in which borrowers known their credit quality but lender do not (Chan and 




a higher interest rate and lower collateral than borrowers with a low default probability. 
Thus, the first hypothesis states: 
 
H1: High ex-ante quality borrowers (low quality borrowers) choose a contract with 
more collateral (less collateral) and a lower (higher) interest rate. 
 
On the other hand, if the lenders can observe ex-ante borrower´s credit quality (e.g., 
Boot et al. 1991), but there are information asymmetry after the loan is extended, collateral 
provides an incentive to mitigate (ex pot) moral hazard due its disciplinary role in the 
behaviour of the borrower (Bester 1994; Rajan and Winton 1995). Collateral prevents the 
high-risk firm from switching from a lower to a higher risk project after the loan has been 
granted (i.e., the problem of asset substitution – Jensen and Meckling 1976) or making less 
effort to realize the proposed project (Boot et al. 1991). Accordingly, riskier borrowers are 
requested by lenders to put more collateral whereas low risk borrowers obtain loans without 
having to pledge collateral (e.g., Berger and Udell 1990). Hence the second hypothesis 
postulates: 
 
H2: High ex-post risk firms pledge more collateral than low risk borrowers. 
 
 Hypothesis one suggest an inverse relation between the collateral and interest rate in 
function of the private information of the borrower about his creditworthiness. In this 
context, collateral acts as a mechanism by which the borrower´s ex-ante shows his risk 
preferences. To measure the private information which is only known by the borrower, this 
study uses a dummy variable, namely credit quality, which is defined based on the borrowers’ 
perception about their financial situation (see section 3.2 variables). Because the data set do 
not have information related to ex post event default, to signal “good” (low risk) versus high 
risk borrowers, the study uses the variable size (e.g., Cowling, 1999; Diamond 1989). Because 
larger firms tend to be more diversified, have an historical performance track record, this 
study expects that firm size is negatively related with risk and thus loan collateralization. 
Hence failure declines with size. 
 According the screening models, by pledging collateral the borrower signals the real 
value and his belief in the quality of the project to the bank (Besanko and Thakor 1987a,b; 
Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas 1985; Chan and Thakor 1987). Consequently, in exchange for 
collateral, the borrower receives the advantage of a lower interest rate, but incurs the risk of 
losing collateral when the return of the project turns out to be too low. But if expected 
payoff of the project is too low, the costs associated with collateral exceed the advantages of 
a lower interest rate, as a result the (high risk) borrower refuse collateralize the loan. 
 A firm that receives more debt attains a higher leverage level and so increases the 
risk of non-payment. As a consequence, it is expected that banks ask for more collateral 




numerous costs that can only be full recovered with large loans through economies of scale, 
the likelihood of pledging collateral is higher for large loan size compared to shorter loan 
size. In addition, long term debt gives to the borrower enough opportunities to alter the 
project in subtle ways or even from low-risk to high-risk projects (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
In this situation, pledging of collateral is an effective mechanism for the creditor to ascertain 
himself of a certain value in the future: a company may not retain its value on a longer term 
but collateral does most likely retain its value (Mann 1997). Furthermore, since an asset can 
be pledge once and its evaluation is costly, by asking for collateral the main bank ensures its 
loan senior to other creditors´ claim and creates a barrier-to-entry for other banks. So, it is 
expected that the loan size and the time to maturity of the loan have a positive impact on 
the incidence of secured debt.  
The third and the fourth hypotheses state: 
 
H3: The loan size is positively related with collateral requirements and negatively 
related with interest rate. 
 
H4: The maturity of the loan is positively related with collateral requirements and 
negatively related with interest rate. 
  
Nevertheless, business collateral and personal collateral may have different signalling value 
in solving the agency problems of debt. Business collateral rearranges the relative priority of 
liabilities upon bankruptcy without altering the risk exposure of the owners. Hence, business 
collateral may actually benefit the firm´s owners. For instance, John et al. (2003) showed a 
positive relation between the use of business collateral, firm risk and interest rate. In the 
context of SMEs, because the personal wealth of the owner-manager is frequently used  to 
access bank loans and cannot be entirely separated from the assets of the business (Ang et al. 
1995), personal collateral may be a better instrument to signal the quality of the borrower. 
The owner of a lower quality firm cannot afford to imitate a high quality firm owner due to 
the threat of losing the personal assets (Brick and Palia, 2007). Therefore personal collateral 
is more effective in limiting the borrower’s risk preference incentives by enhancing the 
likelihood that the principal will feel the consequences of any ex post managerial shirking and 
risk-taking activities personally (Mann 1997). In addition, personal collateral can be seen as a 
substitute for equity investment by the owner: in case of default, the personal assets could 
be sold in order to repay the loan. In accordance with Brick and Palia (2007), this study 
expects that the economic impact of the requirement of pledging personal collateral is 






2.3. The impact of the strength of relationship between the 
borrower and the lender in pricing of loans 
 
 Since reliable information on SMEs is rare and costly, relationship lending is often 
considered as the most appropriate lending technique for collecting information on SMEs 
(e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000; Zambaldi et al. 2011). Good lending relationships 
facilitate the information exchange because lenders invest in obtaining information from their 
clients and borrowers are motivated to disclose information (Boot and Thakor 1994). As time 
goes by, the entrepreneur establishes a good reputation since the firm values a good 
reputation, a low-risk project will be preferred to a high-risk project, reducing the 
probability of repayment difficulties and keeping the value of the reputation asset intact 
(Diamond 1989). Thus, information gathered over time by bank helps to give a more complete 
picture of the businesses financial health (Boot 2000).  
 In the literature the strength of the relationship is measured in several ways. A 
widespread measure is the length/duration of the relationship with the bank (e.g., Ongena 
and Smith 2001). A long-term relationship allows the lender to gather more private 
information of the borrower, for instance about the capacities and the character of the 
borrower, that is, qualitative data (or soft information) which takes significant time to 
accumulate and it’s not easily observed and shared with other financial institutions (Berger 
and Udell 2006). The information generated by lender over repeated transactions and over 
time is also beneficial in terms of reducing the fixed cost of screening and monitoring (Boot 
and Thakor 1994). Such information also avoids the free-rider problem of monitoring since the 
bank internalizes the benefits of such investments. Hence, because this close relation 
between borrower and lender, should facilitate the ex ante screening and ex post monitoring 
and thus mitigate informational opaqueness, the hypothesis five postulates: 
 
H5: The relationship length is negative related with the demand of collateral 
requirements. 
 
 In addition, scope is also considered a dimension of the relationship lending (e.g., 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994), defined as the quantity of products and/or services that the 
borrower shares with the bank (Ongena and Smith 2001). This concentration of 
products/services not only increases the sources of information for the bank but also allow it 
to dilute the information collection costs by the various bank services, gaining in economies 
of scale (Diamond 1989). This intense interaction and exchange of information between both 
parties reduces information asymmetry, reinforces mutual trust and thus reduces the banks´ 
lending risk to this firm. Hence, it is expected that collateral requirements will decrease with 






H6: The scope of the borrower-lender relationship is negative related with the 
demand of collateral requirements. 
  
Even though several studies have examined how the relationship lending affects the 
likelihood of collateral being pledging (e.g., Berger and Udell 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele 
2000), the empirical studies provides conflicting results about the direction and the 
significance of the effect. Consistent with information on stronger relationship, Berger and 
Udell (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) find a negative relation between relationship 
duration and the use of collateral while Menkhoff et al. (2006) reports no significant effect 
and Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) found only a weak effect. But others found a positive 
effect of the housebank status in line with the lock-in hypothesis (Degryse and Van Cayseele 
2000; Lehmann and Neuberger 2001). 
 However, a solid relationship may become detrimental to the borrower if the 
housebank, defined as the first and sometimes the only lender to a firm (Elsas and Krahnen 
1998), exerts its information monopoly by charging high interest rates or requiring more 
collateral (i.e., hold-up problem) from its ex post superior bargaining power (Sharpe 1990). 
Since an asset can be pledge only once, and it defines the order of seniority among creditors, 
initiating a second bank lending relationship is costly because the new lending firm entails 
switching costs for the borrower; consequently, the firm gets locked-in the relationship (Boot 
and Thakor 1994). So, in line with the Petersen and Rajan (1994) bargaining hypothesis, which 
states that lenders subsidize borrowers (especially small and young firms) in early periods to 
be reimbursed in later periods, the hypothesis seven is as follow: 
 
H7: The relationship length is positively related with the interest rate premium. 
 
 Furthermore, because collateralization reduces a bank´s risk exposure, it may provide 
an incentive to the bank to be less careful, or even to engage in a more risky lending (i.e., 
the lazy bank” argument – Manove et al. 2001). Thus, if an inefficient allocation of resources 
the benefits that bank losses will be paid by the clients who have maintained their 





3. Data, method and variables  
 
3.1. Data  
 
For the empirical analysis this study uses the United Kingdom (UK) Survey of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (UKSMEF) conducted by the Center for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (CSME), Warwick Business School3. The first survey was carried out by CSME in 
2004 with funding from a large consortium of public and private organizations led by the Bank 
of England. The second survey was conducted by the University of Cambridge in 2007. The 
third survey was conducted in 2008 among 2500 SMEs (corresponding to a population of 4.4 
millions of SMEs), defined as firms with less than 250 employees in the private sector in the 
UK. Public sector and not for profit organizations were excluded, together with the Financial 
Services, Mining and Quarrying, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply sectors. The sample 
structure was set in order to allow the analysis by size, sector and government standard 
regions. 
The advantages of this data set are threefold. First, the UKSMEF provides information 
whether the borrowing firm has pledge business and/or personal collateral to the hausbank 
(i.e., the main relationship lender). The UKSMEF defines business collateral as an asset to the 
borrowing firm that will be transferred to the lender in the event of default. Personal 
collateral/guarantees refers to assets no belonging to the legal entity of the firm but provide 
by an external party or owner/manager of the firm. In addition, the survey also provides 
information about the interest rate premium paid by the borrower. Second, the UKSMEF asks 
for a variety and detail questions regarding the number of years that the borrower and its 
main bank have been conducting transactions and the list of financial services that the 
borrower has purchased from its main bank. These variables enable us to analyse how the 
business and personal collateral and the interest rate premium are related to the closeness of 
the borrower-lender relationship. Third, the survey also comprises questions related to the 
firms´ perceptions of their riskiness as well the history of past default of the firm and/or the 
owner. Nevertheless, there are several drawbacks of this data set that should be mentioned. 
First, the data related to the financial statements are scarce. Second, the questions in the 
UKSMEF survey are about transactions between a firm and its main bank, but not individual 
loans contracts. Thus, if a firm has multiple loans contracts with its main bank with different 
contract terms, the use rates of personal and/or business collateral and the interest rate 
premium charged may be biased. Third given that the survey does not identify the lender, we 
cannot match the firm-level data with the financial variables of firm´s main bank neither the 
                                                 





lender´s Herfindahl Index. So, the study does not control for the lender characteristics. And 
fourth, the UKSMEF survey (as is the case in the most surveys) deals with surviving firms; 
despite it does include firms that have previously defaulted. Because this study aims to 
analyse the price-setting behavior of banks, the data set comprises only firms that demanded 
for bank credit and reported information related to interest rate premium charged and/or 
collateral requirements (i.e., business and/or personal collateral). As a result the final 




Because lenders do not determine the interest rate separately from any other loan 
terms such as business and /or personal collateral (e.g., Brick and Palia 2007), this study 
employs a simultaneous equation method. This method allows to separately estimating the 
impact of each type of collateral on the loan interest rate premium and on each other. 
Furthermore, the existing theoretical and empirical literature (e.g., Berger and Udell 
1995; Boot and Thakor 1994; Brick and Palia 2007; Rajan and Winton 1995) has strongly 
established that the collateral requirement is endogenously determined. The endogeneity 
problem occurs because the dependent variable (e.g., in Equation 1, interest rate premium) 
may also cause the explanatory variables (in Equation 1, business and personal collateral) 
(Steijvers and Voordeckers 2009b). Therefore, dependent variables are also endogenous 
regressors which are correlated with the regressions errors, and thus, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) can yield biased estimators. To control for endogeneity problem this study uses an 
instrumental variables, two-stage least-squares framework (e.g., Brick and Palia 2007). The 
instrumental variables should be correlated with that equation´s endogenous variable, but 
uncorrelated with the others potential endogenous variables and also uncorrelated with error 
term. Accordingly the simultaneous system of equations is defines as follow:  
 
Interest rate premium = αIRP + βIRP business collateral + δIRP personal collateral  
+λIRPX + φIRPW + εIRP                                                                          (1) 
 
Business collateral = αBC + βBC interest rate premium+ δ BC personal collateral  
+λBCX + φBC W + εBC                                                                            (2) 
 
Personal collateral = αPC + βPC interest rate premium+ δPC business collateral  
+λPCX + φPC W + εPC                                                                            (3) 
  
For each (potential) endogenous variable, this study employs specific instruments. So, we 
rely on instrumental variables to measure the independent variables business collateral and 




and interest premium rate premium and business collateral in equation 3. In addition, in the 
specification, the study differentiates between a vector of independent variables (X) and a 




Dependent endogenous variables 
 The dependent variables are interest rate premium (IRP), business collateral (BC) and 
personal collateral (PC). Interest rate premium is defined as the difference between the 
contractual interest rate and the prime rate (e.g., Berger and Udell 1995; Brick and Palia 
2007). Business collateral (BC) and personal collateral (PC) are dummies variables that take 
the value 1 if the borrower pledges business collateral or personal collateral/guarantees to its 
main bank, respectively. Table 1 presents the definition of all the variables. 
 
Independent and control variables 
 The independent variables incorporate several firms, loan and borrower-lender 
relationship characteristics. Firm variables include credit quality (H1) and firm size (H2). The 
UKSMEF database allows us to define a binary dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm 
shows a low level of financial distress. In the UKSMEF the definition of this variable is 
somewhat subjective as each respondent firm is asked to define its final situation based on its 
own perception. So, this study uses this dummy variable, namely credit quality as a proxy for 
private information, that is, information that the lender does not have or know only 
imperfectly at the time the loan is granted. To identify “good” (low risk) borrowers, (i.e., 
observable signals by the bank), the study uses the variable firm size, measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The bank can use public information to assess the borrower 
quality such as: Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) scores (e.g., Cavalluzzo et al. 2002) or the variance 
of equity returns (e.g., Booth and Booth 2006). The UKSMEF provides the Dun & Bradstreet 
credit rating. However, due the high missing values for this variable, it was excluded from the 
analysis. Because SMEs are not public quoted companies we do not have information related 
to equity returns. 
 Loan characteristics include loan size (H3) (i.e., natural logarithm of the loan size 
measured in pounds), the loan maturity (H4) (i.e., the natural logarithm of the loan maturity 
in years), a binary variable (fixed rate) that controls if the loan has a fixed rate (e.g., Brick 
and Palia 2007), and the fitted values of collateral requirements and interest rate premium 
resulting from the instrumental variable technique (see instrumental variables section).  
As the borrower-lender variables this study includes the relationship length (H5; H7) 
with the main bank (i.e., the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has dealt with 
its main bank) and the variable scope (H6) which indicates the number of financial products 




all products/services, other than loans, which they have purchased from their main bank. 
Then, we tabulate the number of products (and services) for each firm over the total 
products offered by the main bank.  
 As control variables, the study controls for the industry and organizational form. 
Hence, the study includes nine dummy variables to account for industry differences. To 
capture possible differences in collateral requirements due to liability differences between 
firms organized as an S-Corporation, C-Corporation, Limited Liability Company or Limited 
Liability Partnership, four dummy variables were included.  
 
Instrumental variables 
The UKSMEF provides a limited choice of possible instrumental variables. The 
instrumental variable used in interest rate premium equation is the variable firm 
delinquency, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has previously defaulted, and 
zero otherwise. The study assume that the likelihood of a lender to impose a higher interest 
rate should be positively related to whether the firm has defaulted on previous loan [e.g., 
Han et al. (2009) show that borrowers with a delinquent history pay higher interest rate].  
From the point of view of the bank, collect information about small firms is costly. 
Consequently, banks rely more on the use of collateral requirements, especially fixed assets 
(such as real estate), because its value is relatively more stable. Furthermore, by taking 
collateral the bank can guarantee that another lender is aware of the first bank´s preference 
(Boot and Thakor 1994). Hence securing credit limits the firms´ ability to obtain future loans 
from another lender and overleveraged the firm. In addition, pledging business collateral 
restricts the possibility of the firm to sell the business assets pledged in order to invest the 
selling value in new project (Smith and Warber 1979) or to use it for perk consumption (John 
et al. 2003). Thus, for the business collateral equation the instrumental variable employed is 
the variable fixed assets (e.g., Ono and Uesugi 2009). This variable takes the value one if the 
loan must be supported by a compensating balance sheet fixed asset, and zero otherwise.  
However, as Mann (1997) agues, personal collateral is more effective in limiting the 
borrower´s risk preference incentives because increases the likelihood that the principal will 
feel any consequences of any ex post managerial shirking and risk-taking activities. Thus, by 
pledging personal collateral, the owner signals his or her belief in the firm and its ability to 
repay the loan. So, in personal collateral equation, this study uses the age of the CEO/owner 
(i.e. the natural logarithm of the CEO/owner age) as instrumental variable. Young borrowers 
start with scant information in their commercial and financial records, but as time goes by, 
information accumulates can be used by lenders to update their credit quality (e.g., Diamond 
1989). The study follows Bolton (1971), assuming that a small business is owned and managed 













Interest rate premium 
 




Equals 1 if the firm is required to post business collateral; 0 otherwise 
Personal collateral 
 
Equals 1 if the owner is required to post personal collateral/guarantees; 0 
otherwise 
 





Equals 1 if the firm show a low level of financial distress; 0 otherwise 
 
Natural logarithm of firm´s total assets 
Loan size Natural logarithm of the loan size measured in pounds 
Loan maturity Natural logarithm of the loan maturity in years 
Fixed rate Equals 1 if the loan has a fixed rate; 0 otherwise 
Relationship length Natural logarithm of the relationship length in years with the main bank 




Industry Equals 1 it the firms belongs to industry x (with x varying 1 to 9 to distinguish 
between 9 industries); 0 otherwise 
S-corporation Equals 1 it he firm is organized as a S-corporation; 0 otherwise 
C-corporation Equals 1 it he firm is organized as a C-corporation; 0 otherwise 
Limited liability company Equals 1 it he firm is organized as a  limited liability company; 0 otherwise 




Firm delinquency Equals 1 if the firms has previously defaulted; 0 otherwise 
Fixed assets Equals 1 if the loan must be supported by a compensating balance sheet 
assets; 0 otherwise 






The validity of these instruments will be formally tested in the analysis subsequently To 
implement tests for exogeneity, this study employs the methodology of Rivers and Vuong 
(1988) and Wooldridge (2002: 474). Accordingly, the study begun with the OLS estimation for 
the interest rate premium variable and logit estimations for business collateral and personal 
collateral variables, respectively, assuming that the debt contracts terms are exogenous 
explanatory variables. For example, regarding the OLS estimation for interest rate premium 
variable, the business (BC) and personal collateral (PC) variables are assumed to be 
exogenous. Then, tests for exogeneity are implemented. The procedure is as follows: i) first, 
the study runs the OLS regression for possible endogenous variables, that is, interest rate 
premium, business collateral and personal collateral variables, on all independent and control 
variables, including instrumental variables and we obtain the reduce form residuals, ii) 
second, the study then runs the OLS regression for interest rate premium and logit regression 
for business and personal collateral on all exogenous variables (i.e, independent and control 
variables), including possible endogenous variables and their instruments plus the residuals 
obtained in the first step. If the t-statistics on these residuals (e.g., the residuals from logit 
estimations for business and personal collateral variables in the interest rate premium 
regression) show they are insignificant, then the null hypothesis that the contracts terms are 
exogenous is not rejected. If one (or both) contracts terms turns out to be endogenous, then 
the study checks the validity of the instrumental variables by regress the instrumented 
variable on the instrumental variables. Finally, the fitted values obtained from the previous 
stage are used as independent variables in the interest rate premium rate equation. The same 








4.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. To 
conserve space, the statistics for control variables are not report (i.e., nine and four dummy 
variables for industry and organizational form, respectively). The percentage of firms that 
pledged business collateral is 35.9%, whereas the percentage of firms that pledged personal 
collateral is 20.9%. The mean firms pay an interest rate premium of 4.35%. The median value 
of interest rate premium is 5. The mean firms have a 1 519 540 pounds of total assets (i.e., 
firm size), and 57.7% (i.e., the mean of credit quality variable) of the firms perceive 
themselves as low risk borrowers. Table 2 also shows that the relationship length with the 
main bank is 14.5 years and firms purchase more than 50% of their financial services from 
their main bank (the mean value for the variable scope is 55.5%). Looking at loan 
characteristics, the mean value of loan size is 546 074 pounds with a maturity of 9.6 years, 
with 39.6% of the firms had negotiated a fixed rate.  
 Table 3 reports the correlation matrix. The correlation values for the independent 
variables are less than 0.5 (Gujarati and Porter 2010), which indicates that multicollinearity 
was not a problem. Due to uncertainty about the population distribution, the study uses a 
Spearman correlations coefficient estimation, a non-parametric technique based on ranks rather 







Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
  
N Mean Median Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
Dependent variables       
Interest Rate Premium 326 4.350 5 2.850 1 12.5 
Business Collateral 326 0.359 0 0.480 0 1 
Personal Collateral 326 0.209 0 0.407 0 1 
Independent Variables       
Firm size 326 1,519,540 750,000 1,644,093.092 10,000 5,000,000 
Credit Quality 326 0.577 1 0.495 0 1 
Loan size 326 546,073.620 750,000 354,919.814 2,500 1,000,000 
Loan Maturity 326 9.617 12.50 4.541 1 15 
Fixed rate 326 0.396 0 0.490 0 1 
Relationship length 326 14.49 10.00 13.242 0 82 
Scope 326 0.550 0.57 0.177 0.140 1 
Instrumental variables       
Firm delinquency 326 0.215 0 0.411 0 1 
Fixed assets 326 0.534 1 0.500 0 1 








Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Spearman Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Interest rate premium 1 1             
Business collateral 2 -0.138** 1            
Personal collateral 3 -0.014 -0.242** 1           
Credit quality 4 -0.077 0.136** -0.003 1          
Firm size 5 -0.218** 0.318** -0.119*** 0.093*** 1         
Loan size 6 -0.273** 0.289** 0.016 0.037 0.522** 1        
Loan maturity 7 -0.104*** 0.195** 0.018 0.021 0.140** 0.258** 1       
Fixed rate 8 0.505** -0.135** -0.107*** -0.056 -0.147** -0.185** -0.185** 1      
Relationship length 9 0.038 0.104*** -0.033 0.129** 0.183** 0.127*** -0.003 -0.063 1     
Scope 10 -0.008 0.070 -0.021 -0.020 0.192** 0.128*** 0.018 -0.023 0.162** 1    
Firm delinquency 11 0.202** -0.080 0.007 -0.187** -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.021 0.081 0.069 0.063 1   
Fixed assets 12 -0.071 0.187** -0.065 0.108*** 0.122*** 0.085 0.129* -0.061 -0.021 -0.016 -0.050 1  
CEO age 13 0.034 0.034 0.091*** 0.091 0.130** 0.056 -0.021 -0.095*** 0.257** 0.015 -0.056 -0.024 1 




4.2. Empirical results 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the benchmark estimation (i.e., OLS estimation for interest 
rate premium variable (IRP), and logistic estimation for business collateral (BC) and personal 
collateral (PC) variables, respectively), when all the loan contract terms are treated as 
exogenous variables. Neither of the coefficients of collateral variables (i.e., business 
collateral and personal collateral) are related with interest rate premium variable (equation 
1). In line with Brick and Palia (2007), this result suggests that the explicit price (interest rate 
premium) and implicit price (collateral) of loans are not jointly determined. Table 4 also 
shows that the coefficients of the personal collateral (1.734 in equation 2) and business 
collateral (-1.778 in equation 3) variables are negative and statistically significant at 1%. This 
finding indicates that business and personal collateral are substitutes, that is, SMEs can offer 
business or personal as collateral to get their loans approved. 
 Panel B of table 4 reports the exogeneity tests for the dependent endogenous 
variables: interest rate premium (IRP), business collateral (BC) and personal collateral (PC). 
The t-statistics of residual terms obtained from the first-step for business collateral (BC) and 
personal collateral (PC) indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that personal 
collateral (PC) is exogenous but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that business collateral 
(BC) is exogenous, for the interest rate premium equation (IRP) (equation 1). For business 
collateral (equation 2), the t-statistics of the residuals obtain from personal collateral (PC) 
are statistically significant at 1% level, thus we can reject the null hypothesis that personal 
collateral (PC) is exogenous but we cannot reject that interest rate premium (IRP) is 
exogenous. In equation 3, estimation for personal collateral, both t-statistics of the residuals 
obtained in the first-step for interest rate premium (IPR) and business collateral (BC) are 
statistically significant at 5% level and 1%level, respectively. Accordingly, the study can reject 
the null hypothesis that these variables are exogenous. Next, this study analysis the effects of 
treating personal and business collateral as determined simultaneously with interest rate 
premium to test the empirical hypotheses. For comparison purposes, the results obtain from 
table 4 (i.e., when all loan term contracts treated as exogenous variables) are compared with 
the results assuming that those terms are jointly determined. To begin, table 5 assesses the 
validity of the instrumental variables for each equation. This table has six specifications. The 
first, the third and the fifth specification measure the explanatory power of the instrumental 
variables alone while the second, the fourth and the sixth specifications incorporated the 
contribution of the instrumental variables, independent  and control variables taken together 
for interest rate premium, business collateral and personal collateral equations, respectively. 
 The coefficient of instrumental variable for the interest rate premium variable (i.e., 
firm delinquency) is positive and statistically significant at 1% level in the first specification. 
When the independent and control variables are included in the second specification the 




higher interest rate (e.g., Han et al. 2009). The third specification shows a positive and 
statistically relation between fixed assets (the instrumental variable for business collateral 
equation) and business collateral variables. The results remain unchanged when the 
independent and control variables are included (fourth specification). This finding is 
unsurprised because, first fixed assets can work as collateral directly and second, it is much 
easier to gauge the market value for fixed assets than for example intangible assets. The fifth 
specification assesses the performance of the instrumental variable – CEO age in the personal 
collateral equation. The instrument CEO age (0.909) proves to be positive and statistically 
significant at 10% level. Hence, for SMEs the availability of collateral may be determined by 
personal wealth of the borrower, which increases with age of the owner. We also confirmed 
that the instrumental variable for the variable interest rate premium (firm delinquency) is 
not correlated with other potential endogenous variables, business collateral and personal 
collateral variables. The same analysis is conducted for the fixed assets and CEO age, 
instrumental variables for business collateral and personal collateral variables, respectively. 
These variables are not correlated with other endogenous variables. See table 3 which reports 

































Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This study also controls for industry (nine dummy variables) and organizational form  (four dummy variables) but their results are not 
reported. *** Statistically significant at 1% level; ** Statistically significant at 5%;* Statistically significant at 10% level. 
Table 4. OLS estimation for interest rate premium, logistic estimation for business and personal collateral and exogeneity tests  
Panel A: OLS estimation for interest rate premium and logistic estimation for business collateral and personal collateral 
  Interest rate premium (IRP) Business collateral (BC) Personal collateral (PC) 
  OLS estimation Logit estimation Logit estimation 
 Coeff. 
T-
statistics  Coeff. Wald-test  Coeff. Wald-test  
Interest rate premium     -0.006 (0.058) 0.012  0.031 (0.063) 0.244  
Business collateral 0.024 (0.312) 0.077      -1.778 (0.406) 19.189 *** 
Personal collateral 0.155 (0.344) 0.451  -1.734 (0.419) 17.108 ***    
Credit quality -0.224 (0.278) -0.804  0.571 (0.281) 4.135 ** 0.144 (0.302) 0.226  
Firm size -0.150 (0.084) -1.794 * 0.254 (0.087) 8.566 *** -0.150 (0.091) 2.733 * 
Loan size -0.358 (0.121) -2.949 *** 0.299 (0.139) 4.653 ** 0.323 (0.151) 4.553 ** 
Loan maturity 0.074 (0.210) 0.354  0.699 (0.229) 9.310 *** 0.237 (0.233) 1.030  
Fixed rate 2.493 (0.284) 8.786 *** -0.384 (0.328) 1.372  -0.636 (0.362) 3.085 * 
Relationship length  0.247 (0.139) 1.781 * 0.131 (0.145) 0.817  -0.127 (0.159) 0.634  
Scope 0.146 (0.774) 0.189  -0.631 (0.824) 0.586  -0.079 (0.862) 0.008  
Firm delinquency 0.864 (0.333) 2.595 ***        
Fixed assets     0.525 (0.278) 3.559 *     
CEO age         1.318 (0.737) 3.198 * 
Constant 8.871 (1.461) 6.073 *** -9.431 (1.865) 25.560 *** -8.306 (3.222) 6.644 *** 
Number of observations 326  326  326  
R-square/Log-Likelihood 0.322   329.615   288.709   
Panel B: Exogeneity tests 
resid_Interest rate premium     1.510 (1.422) 1.127  -1.986 (0.907) 4.791 ** 
resid_Business collateral 0.745 (1.554) 0.479      39.112 (6.847) 32.633 *** 




Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This study also controls for industry (nine dummy variables) and organizational form (four dummy variables) but their results are not 
reported. *** Statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level;* statistically significant at 10% level 
Table 5. Validation of instrumental variables 
 Interest rate premium (IRP)  Business collateral (BC) Personal Collateral (PC) 










variables only  
  
Instrumental, 










 Coeff. t-statistics  Coeff. t-statistics  Coeff. Wald-test  Coeff. Wald-test  Coeff. Wald-test  Coeff. Wald-test  
Credit quality   
 -0.219 -0.795    
 0.533 3.866 **    -0.022 0.006  
   
 (0.276)     
 (0.271)      
(0.288)   
Firm size   
 -0.154 -1.900 *   
 0.298 12.689 ***    -0.249 8.240 *** 
    (0.081)      (0.084)      (0.087)   
Loan size   
 -0.351 -2.936 ***   
 0.256 3.650 *   
 0.276 3.662 * 
    (0.119)      (0.134)      (0.144)   
Loan maturity   
 0.079 0.383    
 0.694 9.436 ***   
 0.072 0.099  
   
 (0.205)     
 (0.226)     
 (0.229)   
Fixed rate   
 2.479 8.827 ***   
 -0.258 0.868    
 -0.483 2.372  
   
 (0.281)     
 (0.277)     
 (0.314)   
Relationship length   
 0.246 1.779 *   
 0.129 0.882     -0.145 0.904  
   
 (0.138)     
 (0.137)      
(0.152)   
Scope   
 0.144 0.186    
 -0.476 0.363    
 -0.080 0.009  
   
 (0.772)     
 (0.790)     
 (0.827)   






   






   
Fixed assets   
    0.799 11.148 *** 0.605 5.107 **   
 
   
   
    (0.239)   (0.267)     
 
   
CEO age   
    
  
    0.909 2.900 * 1.361 3.405 * 
             (0.534)   (0.737)   
Constant 4.053 23.182 *** 8.881 6.266 *** -1.030 31.246 *** -9.916 31.011 *** -4.831 5.349 ** -6.506 4.262 ** 





















 Table 6 reports the simultaneous system of equations results, based on two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimations. For the interest rate premium regression (equation 1), in the 
first stage, the study regresses a logistic regression for personal collateral (i.e., the 
endogenous variable) on all independent, control and instrumental variables. The fitted 
values from this stage are used as independent variable in the interest rate premium equation 
on table 6. The same methodology is used for business collateral and personal collateral 
equation. To identify endogenous variables see Panel B of Table 4. 
 Table 6 shows that the endogenous variable business collateral as well as personal 
collateral variable becomes statistically at 1% level in the interest rate premium equation. 
Moreover, the positive sign that simultaneous estimation assigns to the variables business and 
personal collateral suggests that posting collateral controls and implicitly prices (some) of the 
loss exposure lenders face in risk loans. Recall that in table 4 these variables are not 
statistically significant. In addition, the results from collateral equations show that the 
coefficient of the interest rate premium variable is positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level, in both collateral equations (1.622 and 2.142 in business and personal collateral 
equations, respectively). In line with Brick and Palia (2007), these results suggest that debt 
contracts terms are jointly determined, that is, borrowers who are charged by higher interest 
rate are more likely to have a collateralized loan.  Moreover, in line with results reported on 
table 4, but in opposition to Brick and Palia (2007), table 6 also shows a significant 
substitution effect at 1% level between business and personal collateral. These results could 
be due the fact that firms may demonstrate their willingness to pledge business collateral but 
in the case of they are business collateral constrained, as the case of most young and small 

























Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This study also controls for industry (nine dummy variables) and organizational form (four dummy variables) but their results are not 
reported. *** Statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level;* statistically significant at 10% level. 
Table 6. Simultaneous system of equation estimation for: interest rate premium, business collateral and personal collateral  
  Interest rate premium (IRP) Business collateral (BC) Personal collateral (PC) 
Instrumented variables: personal collateral personal collateral 
interest rate premium and                                 
business collateral 
Instrumental variables:  CEO age CEO age 
firm delinquency and                                 
fixed assets 
 Coeff. T-statistics  Coeff. Wald test  Coeff. Wald test  
Interest rate premium (fitted value)     1.622 (0.699) 5.387 ** 2.142 (0.883) 5.886 ** 
Business collateral (fitted value) 3.122 (0.714) 4.371 ***        
Personal collateral (fitted value) 13.266 (2.760) 4.806 *** -295.572 (109.832) 7.242 *** -38.679 (6.569) 34.667 *** 
Credit quality -0.6478 (0.283) -2.290 ** 10.163 (3.509) 8.390 *** 4.092 (1.076) 14.453 *** 
Firm size 0.164 (0.104) 1.577  -6.355 (2.374) 7.163 *** 1.977 (0.457) 18.717 *** 
Loan size -0.965 (0.173) -5.588 *** 15.695 (5.825) 7.261 *** 2.663 (0.608) 19.155 *** 
Loan maturity -0.423 (0.227) -1.859 * 14.518 (5.188) 7.832 *** 3.690 (0.743) 24.660 *** 
Fixed rate 3.739 (0.378) 9.892 *** -31.613 (11.719) 7.277 *** -9.464 (2.824) 11.232 *** 
Relationship length  0.344 (0.135) 2.538 ** -3.308 (1.361) 5.906 ** -0.319 (0.467) 0.467  
Scope 0.347 (0.749) 0.463  -9.169 (5.463) 2.817 * 1.582 (2.221) 0.507  
Firm delinquency 0.907 (0.322) 2.820 ***        
Fixed assets     1.815 (1.513) 1.439      
CEO age         0.297 (0.609) 0.238  
Constant 9.120 (1.411) 6.462 *** -110.992 (42.318) 6.879 *** -67.056 (14.572) 21.175 *** 
              
Number of Observations 326   326   326   





 Regarding empirical hypothesis, table 6 shows that the coefficient of the variable 
credit quality (which proxies for private information, and defines the borrower´s credit 
quality known only to the borrower) is positive and statistically significant at 1% level in both 
collateral equations (10.163 and 4.092 for business and personal collateral equations, 
respectively) whereas for the interest rate premium equation the coefficient of this variable 
is negative (-0.648, significant at 5% level). These results, in line with Jimenez et al. (2006) 
support the hypothesis one which states that high quality borrower chooses a contract with 
more collateral (business or personal) to obtain a low interest rate. From table 4, the 
benchmark estimation, this variable reports the same sign but it is only positive and 
statistically significant at 5% for the business collateral equation.  
 Regarding the variable size, the proxy for the observable risk by the lender (recall 
that the study hypothesis that the failure probability declines with size, see for example 
Cowling 1999), table 6 reports a negative and statistically significant at 1% level coefficient (-
6.355) in the business collateral equation but a positive coefficient (1.977 significant at 1% 
level) in the personal collateral equation. For the interest rate the coefficient is positive 
(0.164) but not statistically significant. These results differ from table 4. In table 4 the 
variable firm size is only statistically significant at 1% level but with the opposite sign (i.e., 
positive) in business collateral equation. In the interest rate premium equation and personal 
collateral equation, the effect of this variable is marginal (statistically significant only at 
10%), with the opposite sign compared to table 6. Thus, these results support partially the 
second hypothesis, which hypothesis that high risk borrower (i.e., small borrowers) are 
requested by the lender to pledge more collateral. Bad borrowers (i.e., very small firms) 
knowing they are risky (e.g., Hanley 2002), are very reluctant to post collateral, business or 
personal collateral against borrowing, as they have a higher probability of losing it. Thus, only 
good borrowers (i.e., biggest SMEs) will be willing to put more collateral, especially personal 
collateral, against a loan, as they feel confident that they will not default and loose their 
assets. Furthermore, good borrowers seem to prefer pledge personal collateral instead of 
business collateral (e.g., Avery et al. 1998) to reduce the restrictions on business collateral 
usage, and thus, to be able to employ them in more profitable projects. Therefore, these 
results suggest that personal collateral is more effective in acting as a sorting device in line 
with screening models (e.g., Besanko and Thakor 1987a; Bester 1985) 
 Thereby, the likelihood of collateralization is also determined by the loan 
characteristics (e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000; Zambaldi et al, 2011). The results show 
that loan size is positively related at 1% level of significance with both types of collateral and 
negatively related with interest rate premium at 1% level. The variable loan maturity reports 
similar results. Furthermore, the results from the benchmark estimation, table 4, are 
qualitatively similar, beside the weaker significance of the variable loan maturity in interest 
rate premium equation and personal collateral equation. Therefore, in accordance with 




(business and personal collateral) also has implication for the cost of borrowing4. Accordingly, 
borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral to receive a lower interest rate as predicted by 
the signalling hypothesis (e.g., Bester 1985). 
 The literature also shows that the loan maturity and loan size could also to be 
endogenous variables (e.g., Berger et al. 2003). However, because of limitations of data set, 
it is difficult to find instruments for loan size and loan maturity that would not also be 
correlated to interest rate premium and collateral variables. As robustness, this study also 
tests the impact of the independent variables when the variable loan maturity is excluded 
from each equation. The results of the three loan conditions regression not materially change 
(results not reported for brevity, but available from the authors upon request). 
Regarding the variable relationship length, table 6 shows a negative coefficient (-
3.308), significant at 5% level, in the business collateral equation, whereas in personal 
collateral equation, the result is not even statistically significant. For the variable scope, the 
results also prove to be significant at weaker levels. The results are qualitatively the same as 
the benchmark estimation (see table 4). Hence, these estimates partially support the 
hypotheses 5 and 6, which suggest a substitution effect between relationship length/scope 
with the main bank and business collateral requirements. These results are in line with 
Steijvers et al. (2010) which predict that the length of relationship lending decreases the 
likelihood of pledging any kind of collateral. In addiction according to Han et al. (2009)   we 
can assume that length is an “inverse measure” of the asymmetric information degree. Thus, 
a longer relationship lending can be seen as adverse selection device substituting the role of 
collateral. However, a long-term relationship with the main bank seems to have a positive 
effect on interest rate premium charges by the lender, as the variable relationship length in 
the interest rate premium equation reports a positive sign statistically significant at 5% level 
(0.344). This result is in line with the Petersen and Rajan (1994) bargain hypothesis, which 
states that, the main bank uses explicit loan inters rate as a loss leader to secure long-term 
rents on relationship businesses5. Moreover, the increase of interest rate premium in the 
duration of a bank–borrower relationship suggests “that inter-temporal shifting of rents is 
possible” (e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000:107). 
                                                 
4 It is also true that large loans are more likely to be collateralized because they benefit of scale 
economies given fixed costs of monitoring the collateralized assets (e.g., Han et. al., 2009). This 
feature is consistent with owners who post more collateral can borrowing large amounts. But it may also 
imply a transaction effect because large loans are riskier.  
 
5 Baas and Schrooten (2010) show that the relationship lending  leads to relatively high loan interest 





4.3. Robustness tests 
 
 So far the results provide empirical evidence that borrower uses collateral as a signal 
device of his high credit quality, unknown to the lender at the time the loan is granted (e.g., 
table 6 shows that the likelihood of collateralization is mainly determined by the borrower 
private information and the loan characteristics). Accordingly, there may be no (or even a 
negative) relation between collateral (business or personal collateral) and interest rate 
premium. However, the results from table 6 show that the interest rate at which firms borrow 
is higher for those posting collateral than that those do not, a result that is in contradiction 
with the signal hypothesis. Because in the UKSMEF survey there is no question related if the 
bank seeks collateral from the borrower before issuing the most recent loan or if the 
borrower offers collateral to the bank; and we do not have information about borrowers that 
default after obtaining the loan, this study can only assess the signalling role of collateral 
(business and personal collateral) indirectly. Hence, this study adds to interaction variables to 
verify the main conclusions explained previously. The first interaction variable (INTER1) 
results from the interaction between borrowers credit quality and young firms. Since 
information asymmetry is more likely among young borrowers, the use of collateral to signal 
credit quality should be more frequent among young borrowers than older borrowers (e.g., 
Jimenez et al. 2006). This study defines young firms, firm which age is below to the first 
quartile of the age of the firms in the sample, which is 8 years. The second interaction 
variable (INTER2) aims to control if the main bank charges high interest rates or requires 
more collateral (hold-up problem) by exerting its ex post bargaining power and thus locked-in 
the firm in the relationship. The variable INTER2 results from the interaction between the 
variable relationship length and older firms. As older firms, this study defines firms which age 
is above the third quartile (15 years) of the firms´ age sample. The results are reported on 
table 7. 
 The coefficient of the variable INTER1 proves to be positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level, in personal collateral equation (3.342) while in the interest rate 
premium equation the coefficient is negative (-0.627) and statistically significant at 5% level. 
In business collateral equation, beside positive, the coefficient of the variable INTER 1 (1.385) 
is not statistically significant. This result could be due because young firms tend to be 
smaller, and hence, more likely business collateral constrained (e.g., Hanley 2002; Zambaldi 
et al. 2011). These findings confirm that collateral, especially personal collateral can be used 
to reveal borrowers types, that is, high quality borrowers signal the real value and their 
beliefs in the quality of the project to the bank by posting personal collateral, which 
influences positively the quality of the credit request, as perceives by the bank. 
Consequently, the bank charges a low interest rate. The owner of a low quality firm cannot 




and Palia 2007). In addition, the personal collateral can be seen as a substitute for equity 
(especially for young firms), because these personal assets could be sold and the proceeds 
may be then use by the firm to repay the loan. 
 The results of the variable INTER2 are similar to those in table 6. The negative 
coefficient in collateral equation (-0.246 and -0.187 in business and personal collateral 
equations, respectively), confirm that relationship lending is substitute to collateral 
requirements. Hence, oldest firms with longer relationship lending pledge less collateral 
(business and personal collateral). These findings are in line with the results reported by 
Berger and Udell (1995), Brick and Palia (2007) and Jimenez et al. (2006). But the positive 
coefficient (0.067, significant at 10% level) in the interest rate premium equation still 
suggests that the main bank uses explicit loan interest rate as a loss leader to secure long-
term rents on relationship businesses. 
 Table 7 also shows that once the study endogenises for collateral use in a 
simultaneous equation system, the interest rate premium for firms that are required to post 
collateral is higher than those firms that do not have to post collateral. These results are 
qualitatively similar to those reports on table 6. Thus, the positive coefficient on the interest 
rate variable suggests that borrowers who are charged higher interest rates are more likely to 
have collateralised loans. In other words, hence if a financial institution considers the 
pledging collateral is necessary, the loan is also characterized by higher interest rate. This 
result is in line with John et al. (2003). They demonstrate theoretically that secured public 
debt has a higher yield than unsecured debt, as a consequence of the agency issues between 
managers and lenders, due the imperfections in the ratings of the credit agencies. Because 
reliable information on SMEs is rare and costly for financial intermediaries, the asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lender is much higher for SMEs. Hence it is expected that 
interest rate premium of collateral loans should be higher than non-collateral loans (e.g., 

































Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This study also controls for industry (nine dummy variables) and organizational form (four dummy variables) but their results are not 
reported.  *** Statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level;* statistically significant at 10% level 
Table 7. Robustness Test  
Simultaneous system of equation estimation for: interest rate premium , business collateral and personal collateral with age firm  
  Interest rate premium (IRP) Business collateral (BC) Personal collateral (PC) 
Instrumented variables: personal collateral personal collateral 
interest rate premium and                                 
business collateral 
Instrumental variables:  CEO age CEO age 
firm delinquency and                                 
fixed assets 
 Coeff. T-statistics  Coeff. Wald-test  Coeff. Wald-test  
Interest Rate Premium (fitted value)     0.272 (0.175) 2.409  2.919 (1.054) 7.672 *** 
Business Collateral (fitted value) 2.631 (0.672) 3.914 ***     -47.839 (9.420) 25.789 *** 
Personal Collateral (fitted value) 11.347 (2.619) 4.333 *** -45.998 (12.033) 14.612 ***     
INTER1 (Credit Quality* Young firms) -0.627 (0.260) -2.410 ** 1.385 (1.483) 0.872  3.342 (1.198) 7.789 *** 
Firm Size 0.086 (0.099) 0.863  -0.838 (0.339) 6.125 ** 2.820 (0.680) 17.185 *** 
Loan Size -0.906 (0.168) -5.400 *** 2.747 (0.782) 12.346 *** 3.537 (0.823) 18.453 *** 
Loan Maturity -0.286 (0.223) -1.283 ** 3.130 (0.883) 12.576 *** 4.236 (0.917) 21.342 *** 
Fixed Rate 3.601 (0.371) 9.711 *** -5.701 (1.643) 12.031 *** -12.790 (3.704) 11.921 *** 
Relationship length             
INTER2 (Relationship Length* Older firms)  0.067 (0.038) 1.775 * -0.246 (0.120) 14.201 ** -0.187 (0.125) 2.248  
Scope 0.540 (0.742) 0.728  -2.424 (2.556) 0.899  1.552 (2.418) 0.412  
Firm Delinquency 0.893 (0.320) 2.793 ***         
Fixed Assets     0.534 (0.750) 0.507      
CEO age         0.394 (0.641) 0.378  
Constant 9.915 (1.421) 6.979 *** -22.044 (7.417) 8.833 *** -88.627 (20.050) 19.540 *** 
Number Observations 326  326  326  





5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 This study investigates how the use of collateral affects the incentives of borrowers, 
lenders and the relationship between them in loan pricing. Specifically, the study analyses if 
good borrower may offer collateral to reliably signal their low risk type, in turn of a loan 
contract with a lower interest rate (adverse lection effect) or riskier borrowers are more 
likely to be required to provide more collateral (moral hazard effect). In addition, the study 
also examines how borrower-lender relationship affects the debt term contracts.  
 Using the UKSMEF 2008, the results from a simultaneous equation approach show that 
debt terms contracts are jointly determined. Borrowers who are charged a higher interest 
rate pay are more likely to have a collateralized loan. These findings support the theories 
that view collateral as an incentive device to moral hazard. Nevertheless, the results also 
indicate that high quality borrowers (i.e., borrowers which know ex ante their credit quality 
but lenders do not know, or do not know exactly) choose a contract with more collateral 
(business collateral and personal collateral) to obtain a lower interest rate, suggesting that 
collateral acts as an incentive device to adverse selection problem in credit markets, 
according the signal theory. Moreover, by distinguish business and personal collateral, this 
study suggests that personal collateral seems to be more effective in acting as a sorting 
device in line with screening models. Good borrowers (i.e., oldest SMEs) seem to be willing to 
put more collateral, especially personal collateral, against a loan, as they feel confident that 
they will not default and loose their assets. This strategy allows the borrower to avoid more 
restrictive usage of business collateral. From the point of view of the lender, personal 
collateral is more effective in limiting the borrower´s risk preferences incentives by 
enhancing the likelihood that the owner will feel the consequences of any ex post managerial 
shirking and risk- taking activities personally. In addition, bonding by personal collateral 
provided by the borrower avoids more costly monitoring requested by business collateral or 
covenants (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1991). Furthermore, the loan characteristics have 
implications on the cost of borrowing, that is, borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral 
to receive a lower interest rate and borrowing a large amount with long maturities as 
predicted by the signalling hypothesis. Regarding the nature borrower-lender relationship the 
results show a substitution effect between relationship length with the main bank and 
collateral requirements. However, a long-term relationship with the main bank seems to have 
a positive effect on interest rate premium charges by the lender, in line with the Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) bargain hypothesis. Accordingly, the increase of interest rate premium in 
the duration of a bank–borrower relationship suggests “that inter-temporal shifting of rents is 




 However, this study is not without limitations. First, because the data provides only 
information if the loan is or not collateralizes (binary variable); hence, the study does not 
control for the scale of the collateral provided. This is any important limitation of the study 
according Hanley (2002). Second, this study only assesses the signaling role of collateral 
indirectly due the fact that the study does not have direct evidence of whether collateral is 
sought or offered. Third, the results also show that the strength of the borrower-lender 
relationship translates to an increase in the interest rate charged but show a substitution 
effect with collateral. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate whether the enhanced of bargaining 
power of the borrower is due to hold-up of the borrower or a strategy to mitigate the soft 
budget constrain, and thus increases the availability of credit to SMEs. Fourthly, because 
there is ample empirical evidence that the loan market is highly segmented (e.g., Lambrecht 
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Appendix A:  UK Summary literature of collateral studies 
Paper Data set Method Incidence of collateral (%) 













Data set provided by a 
questionnaire applied to the 
business start-ups which opening 
business accounts at the 
National Westminster Bank of 
Great Britain (1988). 
Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and Logit Maximum 
Likelihood estimates (two 
stage least squares - 2SLS) 
with Overdraft margins and 
Security as dependent 
variables. 
About 80% of start-ups are not 
secured by "Manager or Head Office 
Secured Limit". 
Overdraft. 
Minimum limit is 
£50 and the 
maximum 
£150,000. 
Overdraft margins are positive related to 
probability of default (PD) and negative 
related to security. Security increase with 
loan size and decrease with PD. Inversely, 
margins decrease with loan size. Thus, 
security is important input as monitoring 













Data set provided by Association 
of British Chambers of 
Commerce Survey (1991). 
Logit regression with the 
collateralization decision 
(dummy) as dependent 
variable. 
40.3% of loans are secured by 
business collateral, 16.7% by 
personal collateral and 22% of cases 
are secured by a combination of 
business and personal collateral. 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loan. 
Loan size at £8,000 
as maximum. 
Collateralization increase with loan size 
and loan maturity and decrease with firm 
age. Lending provided by a local bank 






















Data set provided by a major U.K 
bank. Individual loans over 1987-
1990. 
Two stage least squares 
(2SLS) to estimate 
simultaneously collateral, 
interest rate and loan 
amount as dependent 
variables 
62% of loans are collateralized. 
Commercial Loans. 
The average loan 
is £19,000. 
Loan duration seems increasing collateral 
pledge. Relationship lending does not 
have any significant effect in collateral. 
Furthermore, better borrowers get larger 




Appendix A:  UK Summary literature of collateral studies (continuation) 
Paper Data set Method Incidence of collateral (%) 













) Dataset provided by a 
major U.K. retail Bank. 
Credit files over 1998-
2000 





For Transfer Start-Up Group (TS) firms above 
the median of leverage ratio represent 48.3% of 
sample collateralization, in the first semester of 
1999 and 53.6% in the second semester of the 
same year. To Existing Businesses group (EB) 
firms above the median of leverage ratio 
represents 53.3% of sample collateralization, in 
the first semester of 1999 and 43.3% in the 
second semester of the same year. 
Overdrafts and 
Commercial Loans. Only 
include firms which 
borrowed at least 
£1,000. Maximum 
amount is £100,000. 
The two estimation methods used 
produce similar results. EB firms 
need to hold more collateral than 
TS firms. Loan size increases the 
probability to pledge collateral. 
The likelihood of collateral 
requirements also increases if the 




















Data set provided by a 
major U.K. retail Bank. 
Credit applications from 
business start-ups over 
1998-1999. 
Logit regression with 
commercial loan 
rejection as dependent 
variable. 
Firms with extended credit provide 88% of 
collateral given the loan amount requested. 
Firms with denied credit have some 69% of 
collateralization. 
Business credit. Firms 
which managed to 
secure bank finance 
were more likely to 
request smaller amounts 





Increasing the amount of 
collateral available and reducing 
the amount of finance requested 
increases the likelihood that loan 
will be granted by the firm. 
Lender who has previously 
relationships with borrower has a 














Appendix A:  UK Summary literature of collateral studies (continuation) 
Paper Data set Method Incidence of collateral (%) 















Dataset from UK Small 
Firms Loan Guarantee 
Scheme. Information 
about 35 Banks, collated 
centrally by the 
Department of Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (1993-1998). 
Probit regression with, 
Collateral and Floating 
rate as dependent 
variable for the credit 
rationing behaviour 
study.  
30.43% of the loans involve the posting of 
collateral by the borrower. 
Loan Guarantee Scheme 
The paper reports that collateral 
is positive associated with higher 
risk borrowers and information 
problems.  
